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DON’T SAY DEPRESSION: SPECIFIC DIAGNOSABLE 
INJURIES UNDER THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST 
DISCRIMINATION’S PRIVILEGE STATUTE 
Jack Miller* 
Abstract: In 2018, the Washington State Legislature amended the Washington Law 
Against Discrimination (WLAD) to prevent automatic waivers of physician- and 
psychologist-patient privileges when plaintiffs claim non-economic, emotional distress 
damages. This legislation appears to be in response to the Washington Court of Appeals’ 
decision Lodis v. Corbis Holding, Inc.,1which held that a plaintiff waives their2 patient- and 
psychologist-privilege merely by alleging emotional distress damages. The new law, RCW 
49.60.510, prevents waiver unless the plaintiff alleges a specific diagnosable injury, relies on 
the testimony of a healthcare or psychiatric expert, or claims a “failure to accommodate a 
disability or discrimination on the basis of a disability.” RCW 49.60.510 does not specify 
what constitutes a specific diagnosable injury, but the legislative history suggests the 
Legislature was attempting to shift WLAD’s privilege law towards a standard similar to one 
used in federal courts. This Comment explores the federal court’s psychotherapist-patient 
privilege3 waiver and argues that federal courts’ privilege jurisprudence can provide some 
clarity to the ambiguity of “specific diagnosable” injuries. It further argues that courts’ 
failure to consider this legislative goal risks a return to the Lodis-era waiver standard. 
INTRODUCTION 
Debate surrounds what role physician- and psychotherapist-patient 
privilege should play in litigation where a plaintiff seeks emotional 
distress damages.4 Defendants argue the privileged communications are 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2020. I wish to thank 
Professor Helen Anderson for her valuable guidance and expertise in this area. I also wish to 
particularly thank the Notes and Comments team on the Washington Law Review for their support 
throughout this process. 
1. 172 Wash. App. 835, 292 P.3d 779 (2013). 
2. Washington Law Review uses “they” and “their” instead of “he” or “she” to avoid gender-
specific language. 
3. Unlike state courts, federal courts do not recognize a physician-patient privilege. EDWARD J. 
IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES 643 (3d ed. 2016) (“[T]he federal 
courts have largely refused to recognize the [physician-patient] privilege.”).  
4. See, e.g., Beth S. Frank, Protecting the Privacy of Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs: The 
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege and Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages Under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 639, 663 (2001) (arguing that plaintiffs suing under Title VII 
and claiming emotional distress damages should not automatically waive psychotherapist-patient 
privilege); 25 TOBY PIERING, NEW LAW LIMITS DISCLOSURE OF MEDICAL RECORDS IN 
DISCRIMINATION CASES, WASH. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (M. Lee Smith Publishers LLC, Brentwood, 
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relevant to causation because the alleged emotional distress might be 
caused or exacerbated by pre-existing medical or emotional conditions.5 
Plaintiffs claim, on the other hand, that they should be allowed to seek 
emotional distress damages without disclosing their communications 
with counselors and doctors because such discovery is unnecessarily 
invasive.6 In federal court, much of the debate arises from civil rights 
litigation.7 Some argue plaintiffs will be unwilling to pursue civil rights 
cases if privilege is waived.8 
In 2018, Washington State took a side in the privilege debate. The 
Washington State Legislature enacted an amendment to its Law Against 
Discrimination (“WLAD”).9 This amendment, RCW 49.60.510, altered 
the common-law waiver standard concerning the physician- and 
psychologist-patient privilege waiver adopted in Lodis v. Corbis 
Holdings, Inc.10 Under Lodis, a plaintiff waived their physician- or 
psychologist-patient privilege merely by seeking noneconomic damages 
for emotional distress.11 The new statute prevents waiver under such 
circumstances.12 Instead, in order for there to be a waiver of privilege, 
the plaintiff must (1) allege a “specific diagnosable physical or 
psychiatric injury” proximately caused by the defendant, (2) rely “on the 
records or testimony of a health care provider or expert witness to seek 
general damages,” or (3) allege “failure to accommodate a disability” or 
allege “discrimination on the basis of a disability.”13 
This Comment focuses on the first exception: when the plaintiff 
alleges a “specific diagnosable physical or psychiatric injury.”14 What 
constitutes a specific diagnosable injury is far from clear and the new 
                                                     
T.N. 2018) (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510 (2019) and arguing that RCW 49.60.510 
undermines employers’ ability to defend themselves from discrimination and harassment suits). 
5. PIERING, supra note 4, at 1. 
6. See Frank, supra note 4, at 663 (arguing courts should not permit the invasion of a Title VII 
plaintiff’s privacy through discovery of mental health records).  
7. Helen A. Anderson, The Psychotherapist Privilege: Privacy and “Garden Variety” Emotional 
Distress, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 117, 117 (2013). 
8. Frank, supra note 4, at 663 (“If courts determine that a victim waives the psychotherapist-
patient privilege . . . when she [brings] a civil rights action, then fewer victims will act as ‘private 
attorneys general’ for fear of invasion of privacy.”). 
9. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510 (2019). 
10. 172 Wash. App. 835, 855, 292 P.3d 779, 791 (2013). 
11. Id. 
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510(1). 
13. Id. § 49.60.510(1)(a)–(c). 
14. Id. § 49.60.510(1)(a). 
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statute provides no guidance.15 For example, it is unclear if a plaintiff 
waives privilege when the alleged emotional experience is symptomatic 
of a psychiatric condition.16 A reasonable interpretation of the statute 
would require a plaintiff to allege in their complaint a specific 
condition—like Post-Traumatic Distress Disorder—to waive privilege. 
Still, an equally reasonable interpretation of the statute would find 
waiver if a plaintiff said they felt anxious because General Anxiety 
Disorder is a diagnosable condition.17 Fundamentally, this Comment 
seeks to address the ambiguity of the new statute and provide a 
framework for parties and courts interpreting RCW 49.60.510. 
RCW 49.60.510 is best understood in the context of the privilege 
debate outlined above. It mirrors the compromise adopted by some 
federal courts known as the “garden variety” standard.18 These federal 
courts allow a plaintiff to maintain privilege while seeking emotional 
distress damages if the alleged emotional distress is “garden variety.”19 
Garden variety distress has many definitions,20 but is generally defined 
as the emotional experience an ordinary person would experience as a 
result of the defendant’s conduct.21 The garden variety standard seeks to 
allow plaintiffs to recover for “incidental” or “intrinsic” emotional 
distress while maintaining their psychotherapist-patient privilege.22 
Still, the garden variety standard, although attempting to appease both 
sides, is not without criticism. For example, the garden variety standard 
does not readily clarify which emotional experiences are considered 
garden variety, and which are not.23 Therefore, it does not provide useful 
guidance to litigants as to whether privilege will be waived.24 
                                                     
15. See id. § 49.60.510. 
16. See id. 
17. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
432 (4th ed. 1994). 
18. See Anderson, supra note 7, at 137 (arguing the garden variety standard is a compromise 
“between the concerns for fairness to defendants and concerns about plaintiffs’ privacy”). 
19. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 637 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (discussing garden 
variety standard used by some federal courts). 
20. See Anderson, supra note 7, at 138–39 (listing the various definitions of garden variety 
emotional distress). 
21. Id. at 137. 
22. Id. at 138 (“Concerns about routine findings of waiver even for ‘incidental’ or ‘intrinsic’ 
emotional distress damages seem to underlie the garden variety approach.”). 
23. See id. at 142 (discussing the uncertainty the garden variety standard imposes on availability 
of privilege). 
24. Id. (“Measured by the judge or magistrate’s personal yardstick of normal emotional distress, 
the garden variety standard is unknowable in advance.”). 
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This Comment argues that the “specific diagnosable” injury 
requirement of RCW 49.60.510 similarly attempts to allow plaintiffs to 
recover for incidental emotional distress damages without waiving 
privilege. In that way, the new statute adopts the garden variety standard 
and federal case law may provide some guidance to determine the scope 
of specific diagnosable injuries under WLAD. However, the statute uses 
“diagnosable injury” and not “garden variety.”25 It remains to be 
determined how much diagnosable injuries and garden variety emotional 
responses diverge from one another. Still, garden variety and 
“diagnosable injury” point to the same dichotomy: emotional responses 
that are merely incidental to discrimination and those that are something 
more substantial. With that in mind, this Comment seeks to provide a 
historical framework for parties and courts, in order to properly interpret 
RCW 49.60.510 going forward. Because no appellate court has 
interpreted the new statute yet, this Comment cannot say with certainty 
what experiences constitute a specific diagnosable injury; however, by 
establishing a framework of federal garden variety case law and 
Washington privilege law, this Comment can provide guidance for 
courts and practitioners concerned with the scope of RCW 49.60.510. 
Part I briefly explains the WLAD. Part II discusses Washington’s 
privilege law and the standard prior to RCW 49.60.510. It also touches 
briefly on the standards used in federal court, including the garden 
variety standard and the policy considerations concerning privilege 
waiver. Part III explores the history of RCW 49.60.510’s enactment. 
Part IV argues that RCW 49.60.510 was intended to adopt something 
akin to the federal garden variety standard and that courts need to 
consider the legislative history of RCW 49.60.510. Courts failing to 
consider this historical backdrop risk misconstruing the legislative intent 
of RCW 49.60.510 and defeating its purpose: to allow plaintiffs to 
testify regarding incidental emotional harm without waiving privilege. 
I. THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 
Washington State enacted the WLAD with the purpose of preventing 
discrimination.26 The statute provides a private cause of action for 
persons injured by unlawful discrimination.27 This cause of action allows 
                                                     
25. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510 (2019). 
26. Id. § 49.60.010. 
27. Id. § 49.60.030(2).  
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an individual to be awarded “actual damages” sustained as a result of 
discriminatory conduct.28 
The statute does not define “actual damages.”29 However, courts have 
interpreted “actual damages” to include “back pay, front pay, mental 
anguish, and emotional distress.”30 A plaintiff may be awarded damages 
if the plaintiff can prove the damages were proximately caused by the 
discriminatory actions.31 Therefore, a plaintiff is entitled to emotional 
distress damages so long as the plaintiff can establish that they suffered 
emotional distress proximately caused by the defendant’s discrimination. 
In fact, a plaintiff does not need expert testimony to prove emotional 
distress damages.32 
WLAD commands courts to construe its provisions liberally.33 
Consequently, courts avoid any statutory construction that “narrow[s] 
the coverage of the law.”34 This preserves the legislative intent to 
eradicate discrimination in Washington.35 Furthermore, when 
Washington courts have not directly dealt with a legal issue under the 
statute, courts look to federal discrimination law for persuasive 
authority.36 
II. TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE, GENERALLY 
Privilege prevents compulsory disclosure of certain communications 
and related information during the course of litigation.37 Often, privilege 
impacts discovery during litigation by preventing some information from 
being known to opposing parties.38 Privileging information is a policy 
                                                     
28. Id. 
29. Blaney v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 114 Wash. App. 80, 97, 55 P.3d 
1208, 1216 (2002). 
30. Id. 
31. Martini v. Boeing Co., 137 Wash. 2d 357, 371, 971 P.2d 45, 52 (1999) (“[D]amages must be 
proximately caused by the wrongful action, resulting directly from the violation of RCW 49.60.”). 
32. Negron v. Snoqualmie Valley Hosp., 86 Wash. App. 579, 588, 936 P.2d 55, 60 (1997). 
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.020 (2019).  
34. Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wash. 2d 97, 108, 922 P.2d 43, 49 (1996). 
35. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.020 (“The provisions of [RCW 49.60] shall be construed liberally 
for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof.”).  
36. Xieng v. Peoples Nat’l Bank of Wash., 120 Wash. 2d 512, 531, 844 P.2d 389, 399 (1993) 
(“[I]n the absence of adequate state authority, federal authority is persuasive in interpreting RCW 
49.60.”). 
37. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060 (2019) (listing circumstances under which individuals 
will not be compelled to testify). 
38. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged 
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense . . . .”); WASH. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties 
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decision,39 and there are different forms of privilege, including attorney-
client privilege, spousal privilege, physician-patient privilege, 
psychotherapist or psychologist-patient privilege, and many others.40 Not 
every state or court recognizes every privilege, and they vary both in 
terms of what information is privileged and under what circumstances 
privilege applies.41 Privilege no longer applies when the party who holds 
the privilege waives it.42 
This Comment concerns Washington’s physician-patient,43 counselor-
patient,44 and psychologist-patient privileges45 as they pertain to suits 
arising under WLAD.46 In particular, it addresses how RCW 49.60.510 
impacts the waiver standards of these privileges. This Part addresses 
how privilege operates, at a general level. It begins with a discussion of 
the interaction between Washington discovery rules and privilege law. It 
then discusses federal psychotherapist-patient privilege waiver 
standards.47 Finally, it addresses the policy concerns of privilege law and 
how privilege affects litigation. 
                                                     
may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the pending action . . . .”). 
39. 1 GEORGE E. DIX ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 466–67 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 7th ed. 
2013) (“[R]ules of privilege are not without a rationale. Their warrant is the protection of interests 
and relationships which, rightly or wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient social importance to justify 
some sacrifice of availability of evidence relevant to the administration of justice.”); EDWARD J. 
IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES 4 (3d ed. 2016) (“[P]rivilege law 
concerns ‘extrinsic social policy.’”). 
40. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, at 332 (“All states recognize some form of the traditional 
spousal, attorney-client, and clergy privileges . . . . Further, as the Supreme Court noted in Jaffee, 
the states are in accord that there should be a psychotherapy privilege. The vast majority also 
enforce a general medical privilege.”). 
41. DIX, supra note 39, at 490 (“State patterns in the recognition of privileges vary greatly.”); 
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, at 326 (“[T]he state bodies of privilege law differ with respect to both 
the degree of statutorification and some of the specific privileges recognized.”). 
42. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, at 1150 (“It is not a foregone conclusion that every privilege is 
waivable.”). 
43. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(4) (2019). 
44. Id. § 5.60.060(9). 
45. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.83.110 (2019). 
46. For brevity and consistency with federal terminology, I will refer to counselor-patient 
privilege and psychologist-patient privilege collectively as psychotherapist-patient privilege.  
47. Federal courts do not recognize a physician-patient privilege. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3. 
However, they do recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege, which includes privileged 
communications between psychiatrists, psychologists, and other licensed counselors (like licensed 
social workers) and their patients. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996) (establishing a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege for confidential communications between patients and licensed 
psychotherapists).  
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A. Washington’s Discovery Rules and Privilege Law 
Privilege limits the broad discovery rules operating in Washington 
State.48 Parties may discover “any matter, not privileged, which is 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . .”49 
Though privilege statutes directly conflict with the broad discovery rules 
operating in Washington State, Washington courts respect the 
Legislature’s right to establish privilege.50 However, because privilege is 
an affront to fair adjudication, Washington courts construe privilege 
statutes narrowly by finding waivers.51 Commonly, courts throughout 
the United States hold that placing health at issue in a lawsuit—by 
alleging an injury, for example—waives privilege.52 
Washington statutes privilege certain communications from 
compulsory testimony.53 RCW 5.60.060 codifies many of these 
privileges.54 This list includes the prohibition on testimony by both 
treating physicians and mental health counselors.55 Certain situations 
establish a waiver of these privileges. For example, a patient waives 
their physician-patient privilege by placing their health at issue in the 
lawsuit.56 In addition, a waiver of physician-patient privilege for one 
physician constitutes a waiver of all physicians.57 
Washington separately establishes psychologist-patient privilege.58 
This statute states that communications between a client and 
psychologist share the same protections as attorney-client 
communications.59 Vocal communications with psychologists and 
                                                     
48. See Lowy v. PeaceHealth, 174 Wash. 2d 769, 776, 280 P.3d 1078, 1082 (2012). 
49. WASH. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
50. State v. Harris, 51 Wash. App. 807, 812, 755 P.2d 825, 828 (1988). 
51. Id. 
52. See Ellen E. McDonnell, Certainty Thwarted: Broad Waiver Versus Narrow Waiver of the 
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege After Jaffee v. Redmond, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1369, 1375 (2001). 
53. See WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060 (2019); id. § 18.83.110 (2019). 
54. See id. § 5.60.060 (entitled “Who is disqualified—Privileged communications”). This statute 
contains the lion’s share of Washington’s statute-enacted privileges. It includes spousal privilege 
(§ 5.60.060(1)), attorney-client privilege (§ 5.60.060(2)(a)), parent-child privilege 
(§ 5.60.060(2)(b)), clergy-penitent privilege (§ 5.60.060(3)), physician-patient privilege 
(§ 5.60.060(4)), psychotherapist-patient privilege (§5.60.060(9)), and many more. 
55. See id. § 5.60.060(4); § 5.60.060(9). 
56. See id. § 5.60.060(4)(b) (“Ninety days after filing an action for personal injuries or wrongful 
death, the claimant shall be deemed to waiver the physician-patient privilege.”); Carson v. Fine, 123 
Wash. 2d 206, 213–14, 867 P.2d, 610, 615 (1994).   
57. Carson, 123 Wash. 2d at 214, 867 P.2d at 615. 
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.83.110 (2019). 
59. Id. 
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written counseling records pertaining to those communications are 
privileged from discovery and admission in a court proceeding.60 
The Washington State Supreme Court has found the psychologist-
patient privilege and physician-patient privilege to be largely identical, 
despite physician-patient privilege and psychologist-patient privilege 
residing in different statutory schemes and the psychologist-patient 
privilege having no statutory waiver carve-out.61 Extending this holding, 
the Washington Court of Appeals, in Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc.,62 
held that claiming emotional distress damages places a plaintiff’s mental 
health at issue in a proceeding.63 Thus, under Lodis, by claiming 
emotional distress damages, the plaintiff waived their psychologist-
privilege.64 
Lodis involved an individual who filed suit against his employer 
alleging age discrimination and retaliation under WLAD.65 The plaintiff, 
Steven Lodis, sought emotional harm damages.66 During discovery, 
Lodis refused to provide records relating to his past psychological 
treatment, although he acknowledged he had received such treatment.67 
Instead, he asserted that physician- and psychotherapist-patient privilege 
prevented disclosure of the records.68 Due to Lodis’ refusal, the trial 
court granted the defendant’s motion in limine to “preclude Lodis from 
introducing evidence of his alleged emotional distress at trial through 
testimony or documents.”69 
On appeal, Lodis argued that a plaintiff should not waive 
psychologist-patient privilege if they do “not allege a specific 
psychiatric disorder, make[] no claim of an exacerbated preexisting 
condition, and do[] not intend to rely on medical records or 
                                                     
60. See Redding v. Va. Mason Med. Ctr., 75 Wash. App. 424, 427, 878 P.2d 483, 485 (1994) 
(“The attorney-client privilege extends to documents that contain a privileged communication. By 
analogy, the psychologist-patient privilege claimed . . . applies to records of counseling to the extent 
that they document statements . . . made during the counseling session.”). 
61. Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 429, 671 P.2d 230, 237–38 (1983) (“[RCW 18.83.110] 
essentially provides the same protection to psychologist-patient communications as is provided by 
RCW 5.60.060 for communications between physician and patient.”). 
62. 172 Wash. App. 835, 292 P.3d 779 (2013). 
63. Id., at 855, 292 P.3d at 791 (“Thus, when a plaintiff puts his mental health at issue by alleging 
emotional distress, he waives his psychologist-patient privilege for relevant health records.”). 
64. Id. Lodis was subsequently limited to this holding by RCW 49.60.510. 
65. Id. at 841, 292 P.3d at 784. 
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testimony . . . .”70 Lodis relied on federal courts’ standards for privilege 
waivers and argued Washington should adopt one of the narrower 
federal privilege waiver standards.71 Under these standards, a plaintiff 
must rely on the communications between a psychotherapist and the 
plaintiff or must allege something more than a garden variety72 
emotional response to waive privilege.73 
The Court of Appeals disagreed.74 The court held that, because the 
psychologist-patient and physician-patient privileges are essentially the 
same, a plaintiff placing their mental health at issue also waives 
psychologist-patient privilege.75 The court held it is irrelevant that the 
plaintiff never intended to rely on past treatment with counselors in 
establishing his emotional distress claim.76 Rather, by seeking non-
economic emotional distress damages, a plaintiff places their mental 
health at issue and waives psychologist privilege.77 Thus, under Lodis, 
even when a plaintiff does not claim a specific emotional injury, that 
plaintiff waives their psychotherapist-patient privilege and must disclose 
their communications with counselors.78 
RCW 49.60.510 essentially abrogated the holding of Lodis—at least 
to the extent it applies to cases arising under WLAD.79 Under the statute, 
a plaintiff does not waive any privilege by alleging emotional distress 
damages, unless an exception applies.80 An examination of federal 
privilege waiver standards helps clarify the specific diagnosable injury 
exception in the statute.81 
B. Federal Courts Psychotherapist-Privilege 
The United States Supreme Court recognized psychotherapist-patient 
privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond.82 When establishing a federal 
                                                     
70. Id. at 854, 292 P.3d at 790. 
71. Id. 
72. The garden variety distinction and how it applies to waiver is discussed in greater detail in 
section II.B, infra. 
73. Lodis, 172 Wash. App. at 855, 292 P.3d at 790. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 854, 292 P.3d at 790. 
76. Id. at 855, 292 P.3d at 791. 
77. Id. at 856, 292 P.3d at 791. 
78. See id. at 855, 292 P.3d at 791. 
79. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510(1) (2019). 
80. Id. § 49.60.510(1)(a)–(c). 
81. Id. § 49.60.510(1)(a). 
82. 518 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1996). 
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psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Court described a number of 
policy reasons to establish privilege. The Court stated that “[e]ffective 
psychotherapy . . . depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust 
in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure 
of facts, emotions, memories, and fears.”83 Furthermore, establishing 
psychotherapist-patient privilege “serves the public interest by 
facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals 
suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem.”84 Additionally, 
the Court mentioned that “if the purpose of the privilege is to be served, 
the participants in the confidential conversation ‘must be able to predict 
with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be 
protected.’”85 
Though the Court did not establish waiver in Jaffee, it hinted that 
there may be circumstances under which waiver could occur.86 In the 
absence of clear guidance from the Court concerning privilege waiver, 
federal courts developed varying standards to determine when a plaintiff 
has waived their psychotherapist-patient privilege.87 Three standards 
have emerged88: a broad waiver, narrow waiver, and middle-ground 
approach.89 Broad waiver stands for the principle that a plaintiff waives 
their privilege “by merely asserting a claim for emotional damages.”90 
This is akin to the stance the Washington State Court of Appeals took in 
Lodis.91 The narrow waiver approach limits waiver to only situations 
where a plaintiff relies on the privileged communications or information 
in the course of litigation.92 
The middle ground approach is predicated on the idea of garen variety 
emotional harm and finds waiver only if the plaintiff alleges an 
emotional harm greater than a garen variety response to the defendant’s 
conduct.93 Essentially, the garden variety standard seeks to differentiate 
emotional experiences that are incidental to the harm caused by the 
                                                     
83. Id. at 10. 
84. Id. at 12. 
85. Id. at 18. 
86. Id. at 17 n.14 (“Like other testimonial privileges, the patient may of course waive the protection.”). 
87. McDonnell, supra note 52, at 1369. 
88. Anderson, supra note 7, at 118; see also McDonnell, supra note 52, at 1370. 
89. McDonnell, supra note 52, at 1370. 
90. Id. 
91. See Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 172 Wash. App. 835, 855, 292 P.3d 779, 791 (2013). 
92. McDonnell, supra note 52, at 1369. 
93. See Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 638 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
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defendant’s conduct and those that are more severe.94 Garden variety 
emotional distress is often described as “ordinary or commonplace 
emotional distress.”95 Conversely, a non-garden variety emotional 
response “may be complex, such as that resulting in a specific 
psychiatric disorder.”96 Under the garden variety standard, a plaintiff 
who alleges mere garden variety emotional distress does not waive their 
psychotherapist-patient privilege.97 On the other hand, one who alleges 
something more, such as a specific injury, does waive their privilege.98 
C. Policy Debate Surrounding Waiver 
Commentators disagree as to whether privilege should be waived 
when a plaintiff claims an emotional distress injury. Some commentators 
claim that privilege is needed to encourage plaintiffs to bring suit 
without “fear that their mental health with be placed on trial.”99 They 
argue that, often, much of a plaintiff’s mental health records are 
irrelevant to an emotional distress cause of action.100 Still, others argue 
that, in the absence of waiver, defendants can be exposed to large 
damage awards without the ability to explore causation.101 Further, 
because the plaintiff alleges an emotional harm, the defendant cannot 
explore other factors that might contribute to or cause the plaintiff’s 
emotional state.102 
In support of stronger privilege standards, one scholar, Beth S. Frank, 
likens psychotherapist-patient privilege to Federal Rule of Evidence 412. 
Rule 412 prohibits the admission of evidence of a sexual assault victim’s 
sexual history by a defendant during a criminal case.103 In civil cases, 
Rule 412 requires the probative value of a victim’s sexual history or 
predisposition to substantially outweigh the “danger of harm to any 
                                                     
94. Anderson, supra note 7, at 138. 
95. Id. at 637 (quoting Ruhlmann v. Ulster Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 194 F.R.D. 445, 449 n.6 
(N.D.N.Y. 2000)). 
96. Id. (quoting Ruhlmann, 194 F.R.D. at 449 n.6). 
97. Id. 
98. See id. (citing Ford v. Contra Costa Cty., 179 F.R.D. 579, 579 (N.D. Cal. 1998)). 
99. Frank, supra note 4, at 663. 
100. Id. at 664 (“[M]ental health records often contain personal and private information wholly 
irrelevant to the civil rights claim.”). 
101. Anderson, supra note 7, at 119 (noting how many laws or precedents limiting waiver of 
privilege leave the “defendant . . . vulnerable to a large award but unable to fully explore issues such 
as causation”). 
102. PIERING, supra note 4.  
103. FED. R. EVID. 412(a). 
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victim and of unfair prejudice to any party” before the victim’s sexual 
history is admissible.104 Beth S. Frank argues that often a plaintiff’s 
mental history is wholly irrelevant to their claim.105 Yet, when waiver 
occurs, the plaintiff is often exposed to a “piece-by-piece analysis of her 
life,” despite its irrelevance to the claim.106 Thus, there is a concern that 
exposure of a plaintiff’s past mental health treatment can prejudice an 
emotional distress claim.107 
Conversely, favoring broader waiver standards, commentators argue 
that restricted waiver allows a plaintiff to cherry-pick testimony 
concerning their emotional distress claim, while withholding other 
factors that may contribute to the plaintiff’s perceived harm.108 
According to them, medical issues may cause a plaintiff’s emotional 
distress, rather than the defendant’s conduct.109 Thus, if a plaintiff does 
not waive privilege when alleging emotional distress, the defendant will 
not be able to inquire into these other factors to challenge causation of 
the emotional distress.110 
The garden variety standard attempts to balance these competing 
concerns by limiting waiver to circumstances when a plaintiff claims 
emotional stress beyond what a normal person would experience. Still, 
the garden variety standard is criticized for failing to realistically capture 
emotional responses to defendants’ conduct. For example, Professor 
Helen A. Anderson suggests that the distinction between garden variety 
emotional distress and a diagnosis or reliance on expert testimony to 
support a claim is not a useful one.111 First, the distinction benefits 
plaintiffs who have never been treated by a psychotherapist or whose 
emotional distress appears normal to the court.112 Second, “garden 
                                                     
104. Id. at 412(b)(2). 
105. Frank, supra note 4, at 664 (“[M]ental health records often contain personal and private 
information wholly irrelevant to the civil rights claim.”). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. PIERING, supra note 4.  
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Anderson, supra note 7, at 139–40. Professor Anderson recognizes the need for a 
compromise in implied waiver situations arising in civil rights litigation. Id. at 144. However, 
concerns about variability in waiver findings and defendants’ exposure to potentially high damage 
awards without the ability to defend themselves led her to propose a legislative solution. Id. at 152. 
Under her proposed solution, plaintiffs could elect to forego seeking actual damages for a statutorily 
capped amount of damages and maintain privilege. Id. at 153. If, however, the plaintiff elected to 
seek actual damages, then they would face potential waiver. Id. 
112. Id. 
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variety” emotional distress is a legal fiction and the use of terms such as 
“‘ordinary,’ ‘intrinsic,’ or ‘normal’ emotional harm has no firm basis in 
reality.”113 Finally, the garden variety standard stigmatizes those who 
experience so-called “abnormal” amounts of emotional distress because 
the standard draws the line at normal/abnormal emotional distress.114 
This results in “allow[ing] those who were less harmed, and those who 
do not have serious psychological issues, to claim the privilege, while 
forcing those who most value the privilege—those with significant 
mental distress—to choose between claiming their actual damages and 
waiving the privilege or simply claiming an ‘ordinary’ amount.”115 
The garden variety standard is also criticized because of the 
“imprecision and elasticity of the phrase ‘garden variety.’”116 Courts 
vary in how they define the garden variety distinction.117 These varying 
definitions lead to varying results in application.118 Regardless, the 
garden variety standard has gained traction,119 and the Washington State 
Legislature appears to have adopted it in some form by enacting RCW 
49.60.510. 
III. ENACTMENT OF RCW 49.60.510 
RCW 49.60.510 was enacted120 to address perceived invasive 
discovery practices into plaintiffs’ mental and medical treatment 
history.121 RCW 49.60.510 essentially abrogated Lodis v. Corbis 
Holdings as it pertained to the WLAD.122 The statute established that, by 
                                                     
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 141. 
115. Id. at 143. 
116. Id. at 138 (citing Flowers v. Owens, 274 F.R.D. 218, 225–26 (N.D. Ill. 2011)). 
117. See id. (listing various definitions of the garden variety standard). 
118. Id. at 139 (noting the lack of uniformity in judicial application of the garden variety standard 
and that therefore “courts remain free to weed the garden as they will”). 
119. Id. at 134 (“[T]he majority of the lower courts seem to be converging on the middle-ground, 
or garden variety, approach.”). 
120. S.B. 6027, 65th Leg., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510 (2019)). 
121. See S. Law & Just. Comm. Hearing, TVW.COM (JAN. 18, 2018), https://www.tvw.org/watch/? 
eventID=2018011225 [https://perma.cc/SK8N-GT59] (statement of Sen. Kuderer). 
122. Though no mention of Lodis appears in the bill reports, some observers recognized S.B. 
6027 as a response to Lodis. See Christine Willmsen, New Washington State Law Bans Medical 
Records from Open Court During Sexual Harassment Lawsuits, SEATTLE TIMES (June 2, 2018), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/washington-state-bans-medical-records-from-open-
court-during-harassment-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/6E8J-W3PQ] (“The law’s passage stems from 
and essentially reverses a 2013 state Court of Appeals Division I decision in Lodis v. Corbis 
Holdings, Inc. . . . .”); see also S. Law & Just. Comm. Hearing, supra note 121.  
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claiming noneconomic damages in a suit under the WLAD, “a claimant 
does not place his or her health at issue or waive any health care 
privilege under RCW 5.60.060 or 18.83.110.”123 The statute contains 
three caveats that allow for privilege waiver.124 A plaintiff waives 
privilege when they (1) allege “a specific diagnosable physical or 
psychiatric injury as a proximate result of the respondents’ conduct,” (2) 
rely “on the records or testimony of a health care provider or expert 
witness” when seeking general damages, or (3) allege a “failure to 
accommodate a disability or allege[] discrimination on the basis of a 
disability.”125 
While the Legislature was considering RCW 49.60.510, the Senate 
Committee on Law & Justice held a public comment hearing.126 At the 
hearing, Senator Patty Kuderer, the bill’s sponsor, testified.127 Senator 
Kuderer practices as an attorney specializing in employment 
discrimination.128 She testified that during her time as an employment 
discrimination attorney, she witnessed inconsistencies in trial court 
judges’ rulings concerning the disclosure of medical and mental 
healthcare records during discovery.129 She further testified that some 
judges went so far as to order the production of records going back to the 
birth of the plaintiff.130 According to Senator Kuderer, these orders 
chilled claims of sexual harassment.131 She also claimed that discovery 
of medical and mental health records was used by defense attorneys as a 
tactic to motivate plaintiffs to drop suits due to embarrassment.132 
Senator Kuderer explained that one of the bill’s purposes was to 
distinguish between what she called garden variety emotional distress 
and specific, diagnosable emotional injuries, such as Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder or Acute Depression.133 According to Senator Kuderer, 
the statute provides that when a plaintiff alleges garden variety 
                                                     
123. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510(1) (2019). 
124. Id. § 49.60.510(1)(a)-(c). 
125. Id. 
126. An Act Relating to the Discovery of Privileged Health Care Information and 
Communications in Claims for Noneconomic Damages Under Certain Civil Rights Laws: Hearing 
on S.B. 6027 Before the S. Law & Just. Comm., 65th Leg., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018).  
127. See S. Law & Just. Comm. Hearing, supra note 121. 
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emotional distress, the plaintiff has not placed their health at issue in the 
proceeding and should not therefore be deemed to have automatically 
waived their privilege.134 Rather, the plaintiff should be allowed to 
testify to how being subjected to discrimination affected them 
emotionally.135 However, if a plaintiff alleges that the defendant’s 
unlawful conduct caused a specific injury, then the plaintiff under the 
proposed bill would thereby waive their privilege in the action.136 
Waiver of the privilege only extends two years prior to the first 
alleged unlawful act by the defendant.137 This time limitation prevents 
overly-invasive discovery into the plaintiff’s past treatment.138 The bill 
allows the court to extend beyond the two-year restriction should the 
court find exceptional circumstances to do so.139 
The passage of RCW 49.60.510 coincided with the #MeToo and 
Time’s Up movements. RCW 49.60.510 echoes the movements’ desire 
to protect against sexual harassment in the workplace and encourage 
survivors to come forward with claims. Towards the end of 2017, in the 
wake of allegations concerning Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein, 
the #MeToo movement gained national attention, bringing sexual 
harassment and assault to the forefront.140 The movement addressed 
pervasive sexual assault and harassment in American culture and 
throughout the world.141 According to Facebook, “in less than 24 hours, 
4.7 million people around the world ha[d] engaged in the ‘Me too’ 
conversation.”142 
In response to the #MeToo movement, women in Hollywood 
established the Time’s Up movement, which “can be thought of as a 




137. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510(2)(a) (2019). 
138. See S. Law & Just. Comm. Hearing, supra note 121. 
139. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510(2)(a). As of the date of publication, the author found no 
cases explaining what “exceptional circumstances” means for the purposes of this statute. 
140. Alix Langone, #MeToo and Time’s Up Founders Explain the Difference Between the 2 
Movements — And How They’re Alike, TIME (Mar. 22, 2018), http://time.com/5189945/whats-the-
difference-between-the-metoo-and-times-up-movements/ [https://perma.cc/QP58-EFVQ]. 
141. Elizabeth Chuck, #MeToo: Hashtag Becomes Anti-Sexual Harassment and Assault Rallying 
Cry, NBCNEWS.COM (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sexual-
misconduct/metoo-hashtag-becomes-anti-sexual-harassment-assault-rallying-cry-n810986 
[https://perma.cc/3RFK-U6WZ]. 
142. Cassandra Santiago & Doug Criss, An Activist, a Little Girl and the Heartbreaking Origin of 
‘Me Too’, CNN.COM (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/17/us/me-too-tarana-burke-
origin-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/VQD5-8PPF]. 
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solution-based, action-oriented next step in the #Metoo movement.”143 
Overall, the movement seeks to address issues in workplace equity.144 
The initiative has several different goals, including “creating legislation 
to combat sexual misconduct.”145 
The #MeToo and Time’s Up movements did not escape attention in 
the Washington State Legislature. Some 200 women signed a letter to 
the State Legislature demanding a change to the capitol’s workplace 
culture.146 Several bills were introduced in the 2018 legislative session to 
address sexual harassment in the workplace.147 During the Senate 
Committee on Law & Justice hearing on the privilege bill, Senator 
Kuderer mentioned Time’s Up during her comments.148 In addition, 
“during a public hearing about the bill, the chair of the House Judiciary 
Committee, Rep. Laurie Jinkins . . . said ‘I guess we would call this the 
Weinstein bill’ in reference to movie mogul Harvey Weinstein.”149 In 
fact, Senator Kuderer believes the #MeToo movement was a 
consideration for many legislators when the bill was passed.150 The 
coincidence of the enactment of RCW 49.60.510 and the #MeToo and 
Time’s Up movement may explain the ease with which the bill passed. 
The bill received no amendments and was approved with forty-two votes 
in favor and five opposed in the Senate, and ninety-seven votes in favor 
                                                     
143. Langone, supra note 140.  
144. Id.  
145. Jennifer Calfas, Hollywood Women Launch Time’s Up to End Sexual Harassment. Here’s 
Their Plan, TIME (Jan. 2, 2018), http://time.com/5083809/times-up-hollywood-sexual-harassment/ 
[https://perma.cc/9D5B-K84V]. 
146. Joseph O’Sullivan, ‘It’s a Real Call to Action:’ 170 Women Sign Letter Speaking Out 
Against Harassment at the Washington Legislature, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/its-a-real-call-to-action-170-women-sign-letter-
speaking-out-against-harassment-at-the-washington-legislature/ [https://perma.cc/AN2W-JSQ3]. 
147. Agueda Pacheco-Flores, Legislation in Olympia Targets Sexual Harassment in the 
Workplace, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/politics/legislation-in-olympia-targets-sexual-harassment-in-the-workplace/ 
[https://perma.cc/U6Y9-RVDC]. 
148. See S. Law & Just. Comm. Hearing, supra note 121. 
149. Christine Willmsen, New Washington State Law Bans Medical Records from Open Court 
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and one opposed in the House.151 This near unanimity is notable despite 
a similar bill failing the year before.152 
Still, the statute failed to define “specific diagnosable physical or 
psychiatric injury” and courts risk defeating the legislative goal by 
misconstruing specific diagnosable injury. 
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND RCW 49.60.510 
RCW 49.60.510 does not use the term “garden variety.”153 Despite no 
mention of garden variety, the use of specific diagnosable injury is 
consistent with the garden variety standard.154 Indeed, a number of 
federal courts have used the term “diagnosable” as a way to differentiate 
garden variety emotional responses from emotional responses that are 
not garden variety.155 Although RCW 49.60.510’s use of “diagnosable 
injury” is ambiguous, it should be understood as addressing the 
dichotomy of incidental emotional distress. Even so, the statute leaves 
open questions that litigants and courts will need to address going 
forward. This Comment presents a framework to answer those questions. 
Namely, courts should look to the garden variety distinction and the 
policy debate it arose from in order to determine whether privilege 
should be waived under the circumstances. 
A. Federal Courts’ Use of the Term “Diagnosable” 
Federal courts employing the garden variety standard have used the 
term “diagnosable” injury or “dysfunction” to differentiate between 
garden variety and non-garden variety emotional responses. In these 
circumstances, like RCW 49.60.510, privilege would be waived if the 
plaintiff alleged a diagnosable injury or dysfunction, but not if the injury 
was an emotional experience less than a diagnosable condition. 
For example, in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. 
Nichols Gas & Oil, Inc.,156 a federal court, following the garden variety 
                                                     
151. S. 65-6027, 2018 Reg. Sess., at 2 (Wash. 2018); H. 65-6027, 2018 Reg. Sess., at 1 (Wash. 2018). 
152. See S.B. 5566, 65th Leg., 2017 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017). But cf. S. Law & Just. Comm. 
Hearing, supra note 121 (Senator Kuderer remarking that S.B. 5566 differed from S.B. 6027 in that 
it addressed the admissibility rather than the discoverability of healthcare information).  
153. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510 (2019). 
154. Id.  
155. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Nichols Gas & Oil, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 114, 
121 (W.D.N.Y. 2009); Doe v. Brunswick Sch. Dep’t, No. 2:15-CV-257-DBH, 2016 WL 8732370, 
at *4 (D. Me. Apr. 29, 2016); Cadet v. Miller, CV 05-5042, 2007 WL 9706981, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 30, 2007). 
156. 256 F.R.D. 114 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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waiver standard, articulated the distinction between garden variety and 
non-garden variety by referencing “diagnosable dysfunction”: 
Garden variety claims refer to claims for “compensation for 
nothing more than the distress that any healthy, well-adjusted 
person would likely feel as a result of being so victimized”; 
claims for serious distress refer to claims for the “inducement or 
aggravation of a diagnosable dysfunction or equivalent 
injury.”157 
One of the plaintiffs in Nichols Gas & Oil had been treated by a 
physician for “work-related stress” and had been prescribed anti-anxiety 
medication.158 However, the court noted that the complaint did not allege 
any “specific injuries” and only claimed damages for “pain, suffering 
and humiliation.”159 The plaintiff also “explicitly disavowed any 
emotional distress claims other than garden variety claims.”160 The court, 
therefore, held there was no waiver of psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.161 
In Doe v. Brunswick School Department,162 a federal court refused to 
find a privilege waiver unless the plaintiff relied on expert testimony or 
on a diagnosable injury to pursue damages.163 There, the plaintiff 
brought a suit alleging that her son’s school had failed to stop other 
students from harassing her son because of his perceived sexual 
orientation.164 The plaintiff alleged that her son had been diagnosed with 
depression and post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the 
defendant’s conduct.165 When the defendant sought production of 
plaintiff’s son’s counseling records, the plaintiff offered to withdraw 
claims “that might forfeit [the psychotherapist-patient] privilege” and 
therefore would not “pursue any damage claims for medically 
diagnosable (DSM) mental health conditions,” nor would the plaintiff 
“rely on any medical or mental health experts” or their records to prove 
                                                     
157. Nichols Gas & Oil, 256 F.R.D. at 121 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Kunstler v. City of New 
York, No. 04 CIV1145, 2006 WL 2516625, at *7, *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2006), aff’d, 242 F.R.D. 
261 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)). 
158. Id. at 117. 
159. Id. at 121. 
160. Id.  
161. Id. 
162. No. 2:15-CV-257-DBH, 2016 WL 8732370, at *4 (D. Me. Apr. 29, 2016). 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at *1.  
165. Id. at *2. 
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damages.166 The judge held that the allegations of depression and post-
traumatic stress disorder “would exceed garden variety emotional 
damages”; however, since the plaintiff refused to rely on diagnosable 
conditions or experts to prove damages, the plaintiff had sufficiently 
limited herself to garden variety damages.167 
In Davis v. Global Montello Group Corp.,168 a federal court followed 
Doe in holding that, so long as the plaintiff was willing to abide by the 
conditions used in Doe, the court would not find a waiver of 
psychotherapist-patient privilege.169 Additionally, the court held that 
waiver “turns not on a plaintiff’s characteristics or history but, rather, on 
the nature of [their] claim—specifically, whether the plaintiff makes a 
claim for emotional distress damages greater than those that any healthy, 
well-adjusted person would suffer as a result of the conduct at issue.”170 
Conversely, in Cadet v. Miller,171 a judge for the Eastern District of 
New York held the plaintiff had waived her psychotherapist-patient 
privilege when she alleged an intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claim.172 The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the defendant’s conduct 
had upset the plaintiff “enough to consult with a clinical psychologist, 
who diagnosed [them] as evidently suffering from post-traumatic stress 
disorder.”173 The plaintiff attempted to prevent disclosure of portions of 
their counseling records that they argued were not related to her claims 
and were privileged from communication.174 The defendant argued that 
the plaintiff had placed her health at issue and had waived her 
privilege.175 The court considered the different waiver standards—broad, 
narrow, and garden variety—and decided that it did not need to adopt 
any particular one because the plaintiff had alleged a “serious 
psychological injury, that is, the inducement or aggravation of a 
diagnosable dysfunction or equivalent injury.”176 
                                                     
166. Id. at *3. 
167. Id. at *4. 
168. No. 2:16-cv-418-JDL, 2017 WL 875782, at *2 (D. Me. Mar. 3, 2017). 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. CV 05-5042, 2007 WL 9706981, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2007). 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at *1. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at *4 (quoting Greenberg v. Smolka, No. 03 CIV. 8572, 2006 WL 1116521, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006)). 
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“Diagnosable” in these cases was used by the courts to differentiate 
garden variety emotional experiences from non-garden variety emotional 
experiences. A diagnosable injury or dysfunction is not a garden variety 
emotional response. This suggests that the Washington Legislature was 
attempting establish a similar privilege waiver framework by enacting 
RCW 49.60.510. 
B. Non-Washington State Courts’ Use of “diagnosable” 
A number of state courts have also used the “diagnosable” injury 
distinction to tease out when waiver occurs.177 The use of “diagnosable” 
in these instances is consistent with the federal garden variety standard, 
finding waiver only when a plaintiff alleges an injury beyond the general 
reaction of an average person.178 
For example, in a factual situation similar to a typical claim under 
WLAD, the Missouri Supreme Court held that claims of generic 
emotional distress did not waive privilege.179 Missouri’s Human Rights 
Act provides a private cause of action for discrimination in 
“employment, public accommodation, and other interests,” and a 
plaintiff bringing suit under the act may recover actual damages, 
including emotional distress damages.180 Missouri’s privilege statutes 
prevent disclosure of physician- and psychologist-patient 
communications.181 Plaintiffs waive these privileges by placing their 
health at issue.182 In the case before the Missouri Supreme Court, the 
plaintiff responded to discovery by representing that she had not 
received treatment for the emotional distress she suffered as a result of 
the defendant’s conduct, that she had not sought a “dollar amount for 
any item of emotional damage,” and that she was only seeking garden 
variety emotional distress damages.183 The court ruled that the plaintiff 
had not waived her privilege because she had “precluded herself from 
offering any evidence that she sought treatment for emotional distress 
and any evidence that she ha[d] any diagnosable condition allegedly 
                                                     
177. See State ex rel. Dean v. Cunningham, 182 S.W.3d 561 (Mo. 2006); Martin ex. rel. Martin v. 
Town of Upton, No. CAWO200402162, 2007 WL 809818 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 2007). 
178. See supra sections II.A., II.B.  
179. State ex rel. Dean, 182 S.W.3d at 569. 
180. Id. at 565–66. 
181. Id. at 566. 
182. Id. at 567. 
183. Id. 
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resulting from the acts of discrimination or harassment.”184 The court 
also held that the plaintiff could “seek damages for emotional distress of 
a generic kind—that is, the kind of distress or humiliation that an 
ordinary person would feel in such circumstances. These damages are 
generally in the common experience of jurors and do not depend on any 
expert evidence.”185 
In Martin ex rel. Martin v. Town of Upton,186 the Superior Court of 
Massachusetts considered motions to compel disclosure of psychological 
treatment and counseling records.187 The plaintiff alleged that she 
suffered nightmares and humiliation after having been injured by the 
defendant’s negligence.188 In determining whether these allegations 
amounted to a waiver of psychologist-patient privilege, the court looked 
to Massachusetts’ jury instructions concerning damages, which stated: 
“[m]ental pain and suffering includes any and all nervous shock, anxiety, 
embarrassment or mental anguish resulting from the injury. Also, you 
should take into account past, present and probable future mental 
suffering.”189 The court held that the plaintiff would maintain her 
privilege unless she took certain actions like calling an expert to testify 
that she “suffered a mental health injury or developed a diagnosable 
condition as a result of the defendant’s negligence.”190 It also held that: 
Even if no expert witness testifies, the plaintiff or another 
witness may make the plaintiff’s mental or emotional condition 
an element of her claim by describing harm for which she seeks 
compensation in the form of (1) extraordinary and chronic 
mental pain and suffering, or (2) a specific injury or impairment 
such as depression, a mood or relationship disorder, a fear, 
phobia or aversion, or the functional equivalent of any one of 
these conditions.191 
Notably, the court did not consider anxiety to be something greater than 
a garden variety response.192 These decisions further indicate a use of 
“diagnosable” conditions or injuries as a way to determine whether a 
plaintiff has alleged a non-garden variety emotional response. Also 
                                                     
184. Id. at 568. 
185. Id. at 568. 
186. No. CAWO200402162, 2007 WL 809818 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2007). 
187. Id. at *1.  
188. Id. 
189. Id. at *2. 
190. Id. at *3. 
191. Id.  
192. Id. at *2. 
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notably, Martin ex rel. Martin required a “specific injury,” which echoes 
the use of “specific diagnosable injury” in RCW 49.60.510.193 Also, 
while Martin ex rel. Martin appears to consider “extraordinary and 
chronic mental pain and suffering” to be a diagnosable condition, its 
distinction between that and other “specific” injuries could be construed 
to suggest “extraordinary and chronic mental pain and suffering” is not a 
specific injury.194 Thus, if a court interpreted RCW 49.60.510 similarly, 
then waiver would only occur if the plaintiff alleged something specific 
like depression or a phobia. 
C. Washington’s Adoption of the Garden Variety Distinction 
RCW 49.60.510’s legislative history demonstrates an intent by the 
Washington State Legislature to establish a compromise akin to the 
garden variety standard. In large part, the garden variety standard 
developed as a way to appease both sides of the privilege policy debate. 
It occupies a middle ground approach by allowing some plaintiffs to 
claim non-economic emotional distress damages without waiving 
privilege, while still recognizing waiver under certain circumstances.195 
There is ample evidence demonstrating that the Washington State 
Legislature had similar desires when it enacted RCW 49.60.510. 
The statute’s plain language contemplates situations when a plaintiff 
waives privilege and when a plaintiff does not.196 This is consistent with 
the general principles of the garden variety standard.197 The 
Legislature’s apparent abrogation of Lodis also shows that the 
Legislature intended RCW 49.60.510 to adopt a compromise similar to 
the garden variety standard.198 Finally, the use of “diagnosable” in 
garden variety case law as a way to differentiate incidental emotional 
distress from more severe emotional distress further solidifies the 
Legislature’s intent to adopt a standard similar to the widely used garden 
variety standard.199 
                                                     
193. Id. at *3. 
194. Id.  
195. See Anderson, supra note 7, at 137. 
196. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510 (2019). 
197. See supra sections II.A., II.B.  
198. Compare Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 172 Wash. App. 835, 855, 292 P.3d 779, 791 
(2013) (“Thus, when a plaintiff puts his mental health at issue by alleging emotional distress, he 
waives his psychologist-patient privilege for relevant mental health records.”), with WASH. REV. 
CODE § 49.60.510(1) (“By requesting noneconomic damages under this chapter, a claimant does not 
place his or her health at issue or waive any health care privilege . . . .” ). 
199. See supra sections IV.A., IV.B.  
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Although the Washington statute differs from other jurisdictions that 
use the garden variety standard in that the words “garden variety” do not 
appear in RCW 49.60.510, the dissimilarity is ultimately a red herring. 
In essence, both standards attempt to differentiate incidental emotional 
distress from severe emotional distress. Thus, generally speaking, both 
standards seek to waive privilege only in situations where plaintiffs seek 
damages for a relatively severe form of emotional distress. “Diagnosable 
injury” is one standard to accomplish that goal. “Garden variety” is 
another. 
Given that both standards seek to protect privilege in situations where 
plaintiffs claim generalized emotional distress damages, Washington 
courts and practitioners should approach RCW 49.60.510 against the 
backdrop of the garden variety standard and the policy debate from 
which it arose. Under RCW 49.60.510, plaintiffs should be able to claim 
incidental emotional distress damages in most circumstances without 
waiving privilege. However, since the new standard is ambiguous as to 
what exactly constitutes a “diagnosable injury,” it remains unclear how 
the statute will be applied in practice. Therefore, courts and practitioners 
should use the garden variety distinction as guidance in interpreting 
specific diagnosable injury. 
D. Risks of Misconstruing Statute 
Washington courts’ primary function in construing statutes is to carry 
out the intent of the Legislature.200 Courts will need to be cognizant of 
the Legislature’s intentions behind the garden variety compromise to 
properly enforce the statute. Without such an understanding, courts risk 
backsliding towards a Lodis-era standard in direct contravention of the 
Legislature’s intention to maintain privilege in some cases, even if a 
plaintiff claims emotional distress damages. Without keeping in mind 
this compromise, courts will likely fail to define specific diagnosable 
injury in a way that allows plaintiffs to claim any form of emotional 
distress damages based on relatively general emotional injuries. 
For example, a recent Washington Superior Court decision, Tao v. 
Seattle City Light,201 ruled that “mere lay assertions of a psychiatric 
injury” were equivalent to alleging a specific diagnosable psychiatric 
injury and, therefore, the plaintiff had waived her psychotherapy 
privilege.202 In that case, the plaintiff alleged they suffered from anxiety 
                                                     
200. State, Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash. 2d 1, 10, 43 P.3d 4, 9 (2002). 
201. No. 17-2-14287-5, 2019 WL 3333891 (Wash. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2019). 
202. Id. at *1. 
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and depression.203 Importantly, the court did not engage in any 
legislative history analysis because the court found the plain language 
did not “distinguish between mere lay assertions of a psychiatric injury 
and an actual, diagnosed injury.”204 
While the Tao Court found the statute’s meaning plain on its face,205 
its holding risks defeating the Legislature’s goal in enacting RCW 
49.60.510. The Tao Court may have reached a different result had it 
considered the garden variety standard. For example, a federal district 
court in McKenna v. Cruz206 recognized in dicta that a “specific, 
diagnosable mental condition” is distinct from “generalized anxiety and 
emotional upset.”207 Although this federal court rejected adoption of the 
garden variety standard,208 the court’s holding indicates that the term 
“specific” requires more than just “mere lay assertions.”209 
Certainly, the decision in McKenna does not clearly demonstrate that 
the Washington Superior Court misconstrued the statute. Nor is it 
evident that finding waiver under such circumstances was the wrong 
result. However, the McKenna court’s recognition that general assertions 
of anxiety might not amount to a specific, diagnosable injury does 
demonstrate that the language of the statute was not “plain.” Courts 
should therefore pause and consider the legislative history before 
construing RCW 49.60.510 broadly. The announced legislative purpose 
was to limit waiver of privilege to confined circumstances while 
allowing a plaintiff to claim emotional distress damages and testify 
about their emotional experience.210 In fact, the bill’s sponsor, Senator 
Kuderer, specifically stated that a plaintiff would need to allege 
something like “Acute Depression” or “PTSD” in order to waive 
privilege.211 If courts follow the trajectory of Tao and continue to find 
waiver without consulting the garden variety backdrop, then the courts 
may functionally eviscerate the demarcation the Legislature was trying 
to draw. 
                                                     
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Washington courts only look to legislative history if the statute is ambiguous. See Columbia 
Riverkeeper v. Port of Vancouver USA, 188 Wash. 2d 421, 435, 395 P.3d 1031, 1038 (2017). 
206. No. 98 CIV. 1853, 1998 WL 809533 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1998). 
207. Id. at *2. 
208. Id. at *3. 
209. Tao, 2019 WL 3333891, at *1. 
210. See supra section III. 
211. See S. Law & Just. Comm. Hearing, supra note 121.  
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Ultimately, much of the uncertainty regarding the bounds of waiver 
under RCW 49.60.510 results from the Legislature’s failure to define 
“specific diagnosable injury.” Without a practical definition, courts risk 
misconstruing the statute and finding waiver when the Legislature 
intended there to be none. However, if courts consider the legislative 
history—and therefore the garden variety distinction—when interpreting 
RCW 49.60.510, they will go a long way towards carrying out the 
legislative purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
Until courts determine what constitutes an allegation of a specific 
diagnosable injury, plaintiffs and defendants alike will be unsure how 
privilege operates under WLAD. Federal and some foreign state case 
law may assist in determining the bounds of the statute. However, the 
case law does not provide easily applicable standards and Washington 
state courts will need to develop a way to differentiate diagnosable 
injuries from other emotional experiences. This Comment provides the 
background for that analysis. Until then, plaintiffs will likely do best by 
avoiding trigger words like “depression,” even though these words have 
an everyday non-clinical use. Defendants, on the other hand, will likely 
question at what point the allegations of “feelings” turn to specific 
diagnosable injuries. Either way, the statute’s ambiguity undermines its 
intended purpose: to provide plaintiffs with peace of mind that their 
communications with psychologists and physicians remain private. As 
Justice Stevens wrote in Jaffee, “if the purpose of the privilege is to be 
served, the participants in the confidential conversation ‘must be able to 
predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will 
be protected.’”212 
 
                                                     
212. Jaffee v. Redmond 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 
383, 393 (1981)). 
